IN Brief:
- Dragos tracked 90 reported or claimed food and beverage ransomware incidents in Q3 2026, up from 70 in Q2.
- The company recorded 1,266 industrial incidents overall, including 876 in manufacturing.
- The Fairlife disruption illustrates the effects of attacks on systems supporting production without demonstrating that all cases involved shutdowns.
Industrial cybersecurity company Dragos tracked 90 reported or claimed ransomware incidents involving food and beverage manufacturers in the third quarter of 2026, compared with 70 in Q2 and 57 in Q1. Published on 16 November, its analysis draws on public victim disclosures and the data-leak sites used by criminal groups. The figures measure visibility of ransomware activity; they do not mean 90 food factories stopped production.
The underlying records include cases publicly confirmed by affected organisations and claims made by ransomware operators. Criminal postings can identify potential victims without independently establishing successful intrusion, encryption, or the degree of disruption. Even when a business confirms a cyber incident, the affected systems and duration of any production interruption may remain undisclosed. Changes in reporting or criminal disclosure behaviour can influence quarter-to-quarter comparisons.
Across the industrial sectors monitored, Dragos counted 1,266 ransomware incidents in Q3, against 1,140 in Q2, an increase of approximately 11%. Manufacturing accounted for 876 cases, or 69% of the overall count, with food and beverage’s 90 included within that manufacturing total. The company also identified significant activity affecting construction-related manufacturing and industrial equipment businesses. Its industry categories should not be added together when one is already part of a larger manufacturing group.
Dragos reported no observed Q3 case in which a ransomware operator reached Stage 2 of the industrial control system Cyber Kill Chain or directly manipulated a controller. Documented disruption instead frequently followed damage to or precautionary shutdown of enterprise IT, enterprise resource planning, and virtualised services that support operational technology. Production schedules, records, access controls, or shared servers may become unavailable while industrial control logic remains unchanged.
Fairlife, Coca-Cola’s dairy subsidiary, suspended production at all four US plants after a July ransomware incident involving production-related systems. Dragos puts the disruption at roughly 11 days, with most production resuming on 27 July. Coca-Cola confirmed data theft, while the Anubis group claimed responsibility; neither the claimed amount of stolen data nor the attackers’ description of encryption should be treated as independently established. Fairlife’s documented disruption is a specific case, not evidence that other businesses in the 90-case dataset experienced the same outcome.
Food production can depend on business systems that sit outside the process-control network. Batch instructions may be distributed from manufacturing execution software, while quality records, allergen declarations, supplier information, and dispatch instructions are maintained across connected databases. Equipment can remain mechanically functional while a site lacks the reliable records or authorisations needed to release finished goods. These dependencies differ by plant and should not be assumed to have caused every incident counted by Dragos.
Separating office and process networks limits some attack paths, but a segmented plant may still depend on shared identity services, virtual servers, remote access, or backup infrastructure. If those services fail or their integrity is uncertain, a processor may suspend operations rather than run without dependable batch history or quality controls. Asset maps and recovery testing have to include such connections, not only the PLCs and supervisory systems that operate individual machines.
Dragos observed exploitation of internet-facing devices and enterprise applications, theft or reuse of credentials, and evasion of endpoint protection among tactics associated with industrial ransomware operations. Some groups also favoured data theft and extortion without encryption, increasing the range of possible business impacts. For food businesses, that may expose commercially sensitive formulations, supplier information, or production schedules even where equipment remains operational. The report does not establish how frequently those specific types of information were stolen from food manufacturers.
Recovery arrangements need to establish which digital services are required to operate safely, which can be isolated, and how essential records can be restored and checked. That includes recipe versions, traceability data, batch disposition, and quality results alongside network access and production scheduling. A technically restarted line does not automatically mean a food manufacturer has enough trustworthy information to release material produced during an incident.
Across Europe, the same ransomware dataset recorded rising industrial reports. Dragos counted 328 industrial incidents across Europe in the third quarter, compared with 316 in the second. Germany accounted for 66, while the UK recorded 33. These totals span industries rather than representing food-specific national counts, and they reflect the same mix of disclosures and ransomware-group claims as the global dataset. They do not establish the probability that any particular European food factory will be attacked.
The rise from 57 to 90 tracked food and beverage cases over three quarters describes reported or claimed criminal activity rather than the likely length of factory shutdowns. Dragos’s Q3 assessment found disruption involving the IT and service dependencies around industrial systems without observed direct controller manipulation by the operators studied. Site-level resilience therefore depends on recovery procedures that preserve production records, traceability, and food safety as well as equipment availability.



