IN Brief:
- The FSA handled 2,073 food and feed incidents during 2025/26, an annual increase of 14%.
- Salmonella remained the largest pathogenic category, followed by Listeria and E. coli.
- Global sourcing and online marketplaces are increasing the complexity of traceability and incident management.
The Food Standards Agency received notification of 2,073 food and feed safety incidents across England, Wales, and Northern Ireland during 2025/26, representing an annual increase of 14%.
More cases were classified as high or medium priority, continuing a pattern recorded over recent years, although the regulator said increased reporting, altered testing approaches, and changing sampling programmes may have contributed to the overall rise.
The Food Standards Agency processed approximately 12,700 signals during the year. These included laboratory results, local-authority notifications, international alerts, intelligence, consumer concerns, and information supplied by food businesses.
Fifty-one incident and product referrals required action or product removal, while a further 476 were circulated for information or awareness. The regulator also handled 25 outbreaks and 29 clusters of interest, producing a combined total of 54 compared with 66 during the previous year.
Pathogenic microorganisms remained the largest incident category, although the total declined from 451 in 2023/24 to 413 in 2025/26. Salmonella accounted for 206 incidents, equivalent to half of the pathogenic total, followed by Listeria at 92 and E. coli, including Shiga toxin-producing strains, at 57.
Allergen incidents formed the second-largest category, while newly identified forms of non-compliance ranked third. Recorded labelling incidents almost doubled, partly because the agency changed the way cases were classified and entered into its systems.
International sourcing and online marketplaces are changing the structure of investigations. Ingredients can move through primary producers, processors, traders, co-manufacturers, brand owners, fulfilment centres, and retailers before a hazard is identified, leaving several supply routes and legal entities to be reconstructed simultaneously.
One infant-formula investigation involved cereulide contamination associated with arachidonic-acid oil supplied from China and products distributed across 99 countries and territories. A separate case involving eggshell-membrane supplements combined Salmonella, antimicrobial-resistance concerns, and weak traceability in an internationally traded ingredient chain.
Traceability must produce usable answers
Incident complexity cannot be measured through case numbers alone. A small cluster associated with a widely distributed ingredient can demand more tracing, sampling, stock isolation, laboratory work, customer communication, and international coordination than a larger event confined to one product and site.
Manufacturing records must identify affected material without forcing the withdrawal of every product made across a broad period. Lot coding, recipe records, rework controls, intermediate storage, co-manufacturing data, and customer despatch information determine whether the boundary can be drawn accurately.
Digital systems provide little advantage when each department uses different descriptions for the same material. Procurement, warehouse, production, laboratory, and enterprise software may carry separate supplier names, item codes, batch formats, or units of measure, turning a trace exercise into a reconciliation project.
The FSA is developing PRISM as a case-management and intelligence platform designed to connect signals, incidents, and response activity more effectively. Factory systems need a comparable ability to link test results with material movements, line conditions, sanitation, maintenance, and supplier history.
The recent a2 Milk infant-formula recall showed how one specialist ingredient can extend risk across batches, markets, and high-care products. Although no confirmed illness had been reported when the recall began, batch control, ingredient history, toxin analysis, and downstream notification were still required.
Allergen and labelling incidents reach the same point through different failures. Incorrect packaging, an undeclared formulation change, wrong artwork, or a mismatch between production scheduling and label issue can make otherwise acceptable food unsafe for a defined group.
Those incidents frequently originate between technical approval and factory execution. A specification may be correct in the document system while the line receives an obsolete film reel, a recipe change may have been approved without revised artwork, or rework may introduce an allergen absent from the declared formulation.
Online marketplaces create additional gaps where imported products enter Britain without a conventional retailer or clearly accountable operator. Labels may not meet UK requirements, sellers can disappear or change identity, and stock may already be divided among fulfilment centres when a concern emerges.
Mock recalls should therefore examine more than the percentage of material traced within a set time. Exercises need to test decision authority, out-of-hours contacts, laboratory escalation, customer data, stock segregation, public communication, and the ability to distinguish affected from unaffected production.
Supplier records deserve the same pressure testing. A certificate of analysis may confirm one batch result but reveal little about subcontractors, ingredient origins, shared storage, or the systems used to notify customers when a problem is discovered upstream.
The increase to 2,073 incidents does not establish that every part of the food system has become less safe. It does show a regulatory system receiving more signals while cases span larger geographical areas, more complicated ingredient histories, and less tolerance for incomplete records.
Rapid response will increasingly depend on whether manufacturers can connect products, materials, processes, and customers without reconstructing the evidence after the incident has already begun.
