IN Brief:
- Two industrial-kettle incidents at NaturPak in February and March resulted in three worker deaths and two serious injuries.
- OSHA's citations cover pressure and thermal hazards, fall exposure, PPE assessment, emergency water access, and lockout/tagout failures.
- Proposed penalties total $364,100 across two inspections, subject to the US enforcement and appeals process.
NaturPak has been cited by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration after two incidents involving industrial kettles at its Janesville, Wisconsin, food manufacturing operation left three workers dead and two seriously injured.
The first incident occurred on 12 February 2026 at IPMF LLC, operating as NaturPak. OSHA says a clogged vent line allowed pressure to build inside an industrial kettle before the lid opened unexpectedly, releasing steam, liquid, and organic material onto two employees. Both were hospitalised, and one later died from complications linked to the injuries.
A second incident followed on 18 March, when another kettle lid opened while the vessel was under pressure. OSHA says three workers were burned by steam, hot liquid, and organic material; two were fatally injured and another required hospital treatment.
The agency has issued citations covering pressure and thermal hazards, fall risks, personal protective equipment, emergency water access, confined-space communication, and lockout/tagout procedures and training. Proposed penalties total $364,100 across the two inspections, subject to the normal US enforcement and appeals process.
Pressure control sits inside production safety
The incidents demonstrate why an industrial food kettle cannot be managed simply as a large cooking vessel. Once steam, enclosed lids, blocked vent paths, and hot product are involved, stored pressure becomes a process hazard that has to be controlled through equipment design, maintenance, operating procedures, and safe isolation.
A vent restriction can change the behaviour of a vessel rapidly. Pressure that would normally dissipate can remain trapped, while the energy stored inside the kettle acts on the lid, contents, and any worker nearby. The February incident described by OSHA gives a direct example: a clogged vent line preceded the unexpected opening of the lid.
Engineering controls therefore matter before operator behaviour is considered. Venting, relief arrangements, instrumentation, interlocks, inspection, and preventive maintenance all contribute to keeping the vessel inside a safe operating envelope. Where food residue or product build-up can obstruct a vent path, sanitation and maintenance routines also become part of pressure safety.
OSHA’s findings extend beyond the immediate mechanism of the two incidents. The agency cited NaturPak for exposing workers to thermal hazards without quick access to emergency water, for fall risks involving kettles, and for failing to assess personal protective equipment against thermal exposure. It also issued repeat citations involving lockout/tagout procedures and employee training.
Isolation matters during cleaning and intervention
Lockout/tagout has particular significance in food processing because intervention often occurs outside normal production. Cleaning, clearing blockages, inspection, and maintenance can expose employees to stored pressure, steam, electricity, pneumatic energy, hot liquid, moving parts, or gravity even after ordinary operating controls have been stopped.
A safe isolation procedure therefore has to identify every relevant energy source and define how workers verify that the equipment has reached a safe state. That requirement becomes more important where employees are expected to open, enter, clean, or work around vessels that may retain heat or pressure after shutdown.
The Janesville case also illustrates how occupational safety and production reliability intersect. A kettle with unreliable venting or poorly controlled isolation is not only a worker hazard; it is an equipment-integrity problem that can interrupt production, damage machinery, trigger regulatory action, and force urgent engineering changes.
Food manufacturers often devote extensive resources to hygiene, microbiological control, allergens, traceability, and product quality. Those controls are essential, but they can sit alongside hazards created by steam, pressure, refrigeration systems, cleaning chemicals, conveyors, cutting equipment, and automated machinery. A safe product does not automatically mean a safe process.
OSHA’s release is especially serious because the two incidents occurred only weeks apart and involved similar equipment. The agency’s inspections consequently examined not only the individual events but the broader arrangements around kettle design, thermal protection, fall exposure, emergency provision, and hazardous-energy control.
The citations are allegations within an enforcement process rather than a final court judgement. IPMF LLC has 15 business days from receipt to comply, seek an informal conference with OSHA, or contest the findings before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Penalty amounts and classifications can change as that process develops.
For other food plants using steam-heated or pressurised vessels, the useful implication is specific. Vent paths need to remain clear and verifiable, pressure must be relieved before access, and lockout procedures must address stored energy rather than only the electrical supply. Equipment that appears routine because it has operated for years still requires a defined safe operating envelope.
Three employees died and two were seriously injured in the two Janesville incidents. The regulatory case will continue, but the engineering facts already published by OSHA leave little ambiguity about the production-safety issue involved: pressure, heat, and hazardous energy have to be controlled before a worker is placed close enough to a kettle for a failure to become catastrophic.
